


















and Guilt: An Evolutionary Functional
Analysis and Compassion Focused
Interventions
Paul Gilbert
Abstract The self-conscious emotions of shame, humiliation and guilt are clearly1
related to our human capacity for self-awareness and sense of self as an ‘object in the2
minds of others’. However, this chapter will highlight that the emotional and moti-3
vational processes that sit behind them are phylogenetically old and rooted in social4
competition for shame and humiliation and care-giving for guilt. Insight into their5
phylogenetic origins and differences helps us to gain insight into the physiological6
processes that texture them and why they can have such profound effects not only on7
individual human behaviour but also whole societies and cultures. This chapter will8
explore the differences between these self-conscious emotions, how they are rooted9
in different motivational systems and how we can utilise care and compassion based10
motivational systems for the remediation and change.11
Keywords Compassion · Guilt · Humiliation · Reputation · Shame12
27.1 Introduction13
Emotions evolved because they stimulate animals to behave in certain ways. For14
example, emotions such as anger, anxiety and disgust serve the function of detecting15
threats and creating physiological states for appropriate defences (fight, flight and16
avoid/expel). Positive and hedonic emotions stimulate resource seeking and acquir-17
ing. The physiological infrastructures supporting basic emotions are ancient and are18
often referred to as primary emotions. However, the evolution of a range of cogni-19
tive competencies over the last 2 million years including ones for self-monitoring,20
self-consciousness and self-identity, gave rise to self -conscious emotions (Gilbert,21
1998a, 2007; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997; Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007).22
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There are a range of different self-conscious emotions that utilise primary emotions23
but blend them with self-conscious experience. The most common of these include24
shame, pride, embarrassment, humiliation, and guilt (Giner-Sorolla, 2015; Tracy25
et al., 2007). The central and peripheral nervous system did not evolve a different26
threat processing system for self-conscious emotions; the amygdala, hypothalamic-27
pituitary adrenal axis and autonomic nervous system remain the basic physiological28
mechanisms for all threats including to one’s self-identity (Dickerson & Kemeny,29
2004). Rather what evolved were new cognitive competencies that allow these threat30
systems to be triggered, textured and experienced in new ways (Tracy et al., 2007;31
Gilbert, 2009). Importantly, social threats linking to rejection, social loss and social32
devaluation, are core to our shame experience (Gilbert, 1998b; Sznycer, Tooby,33
Cosmedes et al., 2016), and are the most powerful activators of threat processing34
systems (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Indeed, there is good evidence that rejec-35
tion and experiences of shame operate through similar neurophysiological pathways36
as pain (Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 2011) although there may be37
physiological differences between acute and chronic rejection-shame experiences38
(Rohleder, Chen, Wolf, & Miller, 2008).39
Importantly, there are different types of social threat that are linked to different40
types of self-conscious emotion. While shame and humiliation are both linked to41
the evolutionary salient problems of social competition, social reputation and social42
acceptance (Gilbert, 1992, 1998b; Sznycer et al., 2016), guilt is linked to a very43
different motivational process for caring and avoiding causing harm to others (Crook,44
1980; Gilbert 1989/2016, 2009) (Elison andMalik, in this book). The next part of this45
chapter looks at some of the evolutionary origins of certain self-conscious emotion.46
27.2 Intrasexual Competition47
Shame and humiliation are rooted in various forms of social competition and oper-48
ate through ancient, phylogenetic neurophysiological systems (Gilbert, 1989/2016,49
1998b, 2007). There are two forms of social competition called ‘scramble and con-50
test’. In scramble competition individuals don’t interact with each other whereas in51
contest competition they do. Contest competition can involve efforts of one individ-52
ual(s) to prevent (an)other individual(s) access to resources or to accumulate more53
than others. While food or habitat can be a source of conflict the most common and54
intense forms of conflict are over sexual access. This is called intrasexual competition55
indicating competitiveness between same gender members. Intrasexual competition56
can be aggressive. In species where females come into uterus episodically and rela-57
tively short-term, the males can engage in intense aggressive competition for short58
periods of time. For example, the females of the Big Horn mountain goat secrete59
pheromones into the atmosphere as they come into uterus and this has an impact on60
the males who then start intense head-butting fights for dominance (Farke, 2008).61
Indeed, they have evolved highly thickened skulls that allow them to crash into each62

















27 Distinguishing Shame, Humiliation and Guilt … 3
other at 35 km an hour! Although fights for dominance can occur at other times,63
outside periods of sexual competition, males live comparatively peacefully together.64
Primates do not have any specific breeding seasons in competing for resources.65
Rather contest conflicts are regulated through the development of dominance and66
status hierarchies. These hierarchies are established partly through displays that are67
called ritualistic agonistic display behaviours. Such displays signal resource hold-68
ing power (RHP), sometimes seen as fighting ability, but also the alliances one can69
call on to help in a conflict (Caryl, 1988). These allow competitors to weigh each70
other up (utilise social comparison) and for those who assess themselves to be less71
powerful to back off or submit. Although typically associated with male competi-72
tive behaviour females also engage in agonistic behaviours that require submissive73
behaviours from subordinates. Looked at another way some individuals will escalate74
conflicts exhibitingmore anger and aggression to a challenge or in a conflict, whereas75
others will show what has been called a fear-dove strategy of seeking to de-escalate76
the conflict using submissive and appeasing behaviour (Archer, 1988; Caryl, 1988).77
In many primate species females are as rank sensitive as males and dominant females78
can be very threatening to subordinate females and even their infants. In addition,79
they prefer courtships with more dominant males (Abbott et al., 2003). It is in these80
basic and ancient social dispositions we can see the human origins of shame and81
humiliation.82
In humans, down rank competitive attacks are less physical (although they can83
be) and depend more on the symbolic representation of self and social presentation84
(reputation). Buss and Dreden (1990) found that the content of derogation and sham-85
ing differed for male-on-male and female-on-female shaming, with male-on-male86
shame focusing on notions of weakness and sexual incompetence and female-on-87
female shame focusing on appearance, promiscuous and sexual (un)attractiveness.88
Baumeister and Twenge (2002) suggest that female-on-female shaming for sexual89
activities and appearance can be a means of sexual competition to regulate female90
sexuality and that these become culturally shared values (e.g. women should not be91
promiscuous or use their sexuality to advance their careers). Shaming and reputation92
undermining are the means for controlling female sexual choice.93
27.3 Submissiveness and Shame94
Whether down rank attacks are physical or symbolic, understanding the origins and95
functions of submissive behaviour and signals, that try to limit the damage of such96
attacks, offer clues to the origins of shame responding and its behavioural profiles.97
Indeed, the submissive signal has long been linked to the phylogenetic origins of98
shame displays because they evolved to inhibit attacks by dominant, threatening oth-99
ers (Gilbert 1998b; Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Keltner, 1995). It is the subordinate’s100
ability to express a submissive display, that downgrades the hostile intent of the101
more dominant, which enables it to continue within a group where others are more102
powerful. Hence, submissive behaviours evolved as fundamental defensive social103


















behaviours which facilitate control over aggression and enable social cohesion. As104
MacLean (1990) points out:105
….Ethologists have made it popularly known….. that a passive response (a submissive106
display) to an aggressive display may make it possible under most circumstances to avoid107
unnecessary, and sometimes mortal, conflict. Hence it could be argued that the submissive108
display is the most important of all displays because without it numerous individuals might109
not survive. (italics added, p. 235)110
There are a variety of submissive displays that depend on context, but as a general111
rule submissive displays involve eye gaze avoidance, curling the body to look smaller,112
social wariness, and inhibiting outputs (Gilbert, 2000a). These are also the basis113
of shame displays and have the same function as a submissive behaviour in an114
aggressive context, which is basically reducing aggressive or rejecting behaviour115
frommore powerful others (Keltner, 1995).Martens, Tracy and Shariff (2012) review116
many studies showing that in contexts of potential conflict or transgression shame117
displays do indeed reduce hostility; although this can be relatively specific to in-118
groups. Submissive displays may not protect one from outgroup hostility. In self-119
report studies, shame proneness is also highly correlated with submissive behaviour120
(Gilbert, 2000b; Gilbert, Pehl, & Allan, 1994).121
27.4 Intersexual Competition122
Intersexual competition is related to the ability to attract or gain access to reproductive123
partners; members of the opposite sex. Whereas intrasexual competition can use124
the strategies of threat and inhibition intersexual competition involves strategies125
of attraction, approach and positive affect. This is not to deny that males can be126
threatening towards females and even that some forms of copulation are not far short127
of rape; and of course, in humans’ rape is tragically all too common. Nor should we128
overlook the fact that in some species males can kill off the young of other males129
in order to bring the female into oestrus. Nonetheless, for our purposes here we130
will focus on the most shame-relevant important dynamic of intersexual competition131
which pertains to the dimension of enticement and attraction and eliciting voluntary132
engaging and helpful behaviour from others (Gilbert, 1998b, 2007).133
The desire to display positive characteristics of ourselves in order to stimulate134
positive emotions in others, and attract and elicit the positive intentions of others,135
is well established as a human motive. As the social anthropologist Barkow (1980,136
1989) pointed out some years ago it is a strategy that now permeates nearly all forms137
of human social competition. Various forms of headdresses, cloths, make up and138
body shaping, athletic displays, displays of any skill or talent and of course displays139
of wealth such as fast cars, are forms of social display that invites positive audi-140
ence judgement. It is believed that when metals were first discovered they were used141
as adornments rather than instruments or weapons. Rather than fighting or threat-142
ening aggression, competition by attraction is aimed to create positive evaluation143
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in the minds of others so one is chosen as a partner in particular roles (Barkow,144
1980). Gilbert (1989/2016, 1997; Gilbert, Price, & Allan 1995) suggested that145
whereas in the aggressive context, where the focus is on resource holding potential146
(Caryl, 1988) in the attracting competitive arenas it is on social holding potential147
(SAHP); that is the ability to influence the minds of others positively such that one148
is seen as a valued, desired and attractive agent and avoid being marginalised or149
rejected (Gilbert, 1997, 2007). To have positive SAHP is to be an individual who is150
liked and valued by others whereas negative SAHP would be an individual who is151
ignored, disliked and shunned; in other words the emotions created in the interper-152
sonal field can be positive, indifferent or negative which will impact on the style of153
relating that individual can elicit from others. In her book Survival of the Prettiest,154
Etcoff (1999) highlights the benefits of being able to compete on various attraction155
dimensions. Individuals deemed to have physical attractiveness as well as attractive156
personalities have better outcomes in terms of choice of sexual partners, supportive157
social networks and job opportunities.158
Using this concept, shame can be seen as an experience of having low or negative159
SAHP; that one is perceived to be unattractive in some way and worthy of marginal-160
isation, exclusion, rejection or even persecution. Because the underlying dynamic is161
competitive then the defensive behaviour, to avoid exclusion, rejection or persecution162
remains, a submissive display rather than an overly confident, hubristic or aggressive163
display. Hence, many of the dimensions of shame are ones of social competitiveness.164
For example, the body and body appearance are major sources for people to expe-165
rience a sense of inferiority, undesirability and shame (Andrews, 2002; Gilbert &166
Miles, 2002; Lamarche, Ozimok, Gammage, &Muir, 2017). But any display, be it of167
various athletic or intellectual talents and skills, that is rejected by an audience can168
be a source for shame because it indicates devaluation of self in the mind of others.169
In his book On The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals Darwin (1872)170
was clear that self-conscious emotions such as blushing, embarrassment and shame171
are all related to how we experience ourselves in the minds of others. Some years172
later Charles HortonCooley, in 1902 coined the term The LookingGlass Self (Elison,173
in this book), highlighting the fact that we experience ourselves through the minds174
of others. Scheff (1988) articulated this theme in his approach to shame. One of the175
major shame theorist Michael Lewis (1992) highlights the social dynamic of shame176
by referring to shame as the affect of exposure. Mollon (1984) refers to the existential177
writings of Sartre to highlight the same theme:178
To see oneself blushing and to feel oneself sweating, etc., are inaccurate expressions which179
the shy person uses to describe his state; what he really means is that he is physically and180
constantly conscious of his body, not as it is for him but as it is for the Other….. We often181
say that the shy man is embarrassed by his own body. Actually, this is incorrect; I cannot182
be embarrassed by my own body as I exist in it. It is my body as it is for the Other which183
embarrasses me. (As quoted by Mollon 1984, p. 212)184
Sznycer et al. (2016) also articulated an evolvedmodel of shame rooted in compet-185
itive behaviour and reputation regulation. They investigated the relationship between186
social devaluation and shame in a number of different cultures including America,187
India (Bhawuk and Malik, in this book) and Israel. As expected shame was very188


















highly correlated with experiences of social devaluation across cultures. What sits189
behind these concerns is social competition.190
27.5 Shame and the Self191
External shame then, focuses attention and cognitive processing onwhat’s happening192
in the minds of others in relationship to the self. Internal shame focuses attention193
inwards, links to self-evaluation, often with forms of self-criticism (Gilbert 1992,194
1998b, 2007; Giner-Sorolla, 2015). Competencies for self-awareness and judgement195
probably began to evolve around 2million years ago. Early humans began to develop196
a form of social intelligence that allowed for new types of self-awareness, and self-197
insight (Gilbert, 2017b, 2018), Sedikides and Skowronski (1997) outline possible198
origins and precursors for a capacity to symbolise ‘a self.’199
Symbolic self-other awareness is the ability to imagine the self (or other) as an200
object and to judge and give value to self and other, to have self-esteem, pride or201
shame, or allocate positive or negative values to self and others (good and able, or202
worthless and useless). Our experience of ourselves, and our judgement of ourselves,203
is therefore partly linked to ourselves as a social agent and cannot be decontextualised204
from the social. The biblical myth of Adam and Eve is a story of shame. It conveys205
the ideas that shame is related to becoming self-aware, aware of another(s) security,206
and fear of transgression against authority with possible consequent punishment. It207
also attests to the antiquity of shame.208
Although shame has been linked to failing to meet self-standards, the evidence209
does not support this view unless these ‘failures’ are seen to render one as an unattrac-210
tive social agent in someway. Indeed, exploring the idea that shamewas about failure211
to live up to ideals and using qualitative methods Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera andMas-212
colo (1995) found that:213
To our surprise we found that most of the participants rejected this formulation. Rather,214
when ashamed, participants talked about being who they did not want to be. That is, they215
experienced themselves as embodying an anti-ideal, rather than simply not being who they216
wanted to be. The participants said things like. “I am fat and ugly,” not “I failed to be pretty;”217
or “I am bad and evil,” not “I am not as good as I want to be.” This difference in emphasis is218
not simply semantic. Participants insisted that the distinction was important…… (p. 277).219
Internal shame requires that there is some self-perception, evaluation or appraisal220
of self as actually “unattractive”—not just a failure to reach a standard (Gilbert, 1992,221
1997, 1998b); that is to say it is closeness to an undesired and unattractive self rather222
than distance from a desired self that is at issue (Ogilive, 1987). The dynamic of an223
unattractive self, that’s under scrutiny and seen as unworthy or incompetent in some224
way underpins many forms of mental health problems including depression (Gilbert,225
2013) and social anxiety (Gilbert, 2014).226
Although some authors regard shame as linked to a global self-evaluation, oth-227
ers have highlighted the fact that we can feel shame for specific aspects of our-228
selves. For example body shame (Andrews, 1995; Gilbert & Miles, 2002; Lamarche229
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et al., 2017) and appearance (Kellett & Gilbert, 2001). Indeed, Andrews, Qian and230
Valentine, (2002) developed a self-report shame scale that measures characterologi-231
cal, behavioural and bodily shame as different dimensions of shame. Shame can be232
focused on specific characteristics of body function such as impotence, shape, size233
and appearance. Body focused shame underpins BodyDysmorphic Disorder (Gilbert234
&Miles, 2002). And shame can be a serious problem in how people seek out medical235
help for diseases that can be unattractive in appearance, secretions or deemed to be236
self-induced (Gilbert, 2017a). People can delay seeking help for bowel cancer or237
sexually transmitted diseases because of shame issues. Fear of shame can motivate238
concealment and non-sharing of personal information such as past trauma, behaviour239
or emotions or fantasies. Fear of shame can have very serious consequences on peo-240
ple’s abilities to develop open trusting and affiliative relationships (Gilbert, 2009).241
Part of psychotherapy can be working with what people have ‘shamefully’ concealed242
and creates feelings of disconnection. In these contexts clients canmonitor very care-243
fully what they think the therapist might be thinking of them; their SAHP in the mind244
of the therapist.245
While subordination, submissiveness and shame overlap, they are not the same.246
One can be submissive and recognise one’s subordinate status without feeling shame.247
Indeed, in some contexts one may be willingly submissive to an adored leader.248
Another example that both Scott (1990) in his book, Domination and the Arts of249
Resistance and also Goffman’s in his work on social stigma (1968), make clear is250
that there is a public and private face to acts of subordination.What is said and agreed251
in public may be very different in private. Compliance to authority, even public acts252
of (involuntary) subordination, do not suggest shame but social fear (Gilbert, 1992).253
It is also possible to have a sense of external shame but not to internalise that. For254
example, some people who have battled with sexual orientation may not experience255
internal shame but can be very hurt by experiencing stigma and external shame.256
27.6 Humiliation257
The term humiliation has many meanings. For example, a humiliating defeat can258
imply defeat in the face of an expectation of wining, perhaps where one had all the259
advantages. It can also be used to describe a large margin between the winner and260
loser. Figure 27.1 outlines some of these distinctions.261
Although often seen as similar to shame, and with many overlapping features,262
humiliation differs from shame in important ways. Like shame, humiliation is rooted263
in the competitive dynamics and negotiating our social place in the world; status and264
social fit. Shame involves a sense of self as damaged as a social agent, and when265
internalised can be associated with negative judgements of the self even self-disgust266
and hatred. Although self-blame is not necessary for shame (we can be ashamed of267
a birth defect or deformity, for example, and we can feel a sense of shame through268
association with stigmatised or shamed others) for the most part there is some sense269
of personal identification with the shamed identity (Tracy et al. 2007). As noted270


















elsewhere this is not the case for humiliation (Gilbert, 1998b). There is growing271
consensus that humiliation is associated with desires for vengeance in a way that272
shame may not be (Gilbert,1998b). Trumbull (2008) also highlights how humiliation273
generates aggressive, defensive responses directed at restoration of status, and to274
depose the humiliator and counter humiliate him or her.275
In a major review of the literature on humiliation Elison (in this book) and Harter276
(2007) highlight the fact that the social devaluation is regarded as unjustified, as an277
injustice; individuals feel they have been ridiculed, taunted, bullied even tortured and278
devalued by others unfairly and unjustly; ‘they have been wronged.’ Whereas shame279
typically involves fear-based emotions, humiliation is one of anger and vengeance.280
Even if individuals feel they are in subordinate positions the desire for vengeance can281
be intense. Elison and Harter (2007) highlight examples of school shootings where282
individuals have often felt humiliated and ridiculed by others and their killing sprees283
were based on humiliated rage. This is true in groups, tribes and countries too where284
individuals who feel humiliated can have serious desires for vengeance. One of the285
drivers of theSecondWorldWarwas the humiliation the allies heapedon theGermans286
for the First World War in the Treaty of Versailles (Mayer on shame in Germany, in287
this book). For themost part the humiliated person feels that the humiliator purposely288
and deliberately sought to create a sense of ridicule and inferiority in them. In torture289
for example, humiliating rituals even including being urinated and defecated on can290
be part of the process; it is a demonstration of power. Indeed, although we often think291
that torture and humiliation are to dehumanise people in fact it’s the very awareness of292
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Fig. 27.1 Similarities and distinctions between shame and humiliation (From Gilbert 1997, 2018)
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our human needs for connectedness and to be respected valued and esteemed (to have293
positive SAHP) that the humiliator plays on. During the emergence of the Holocaust294
Jews were made to do humiliating acts such as scrubbing streets with toothbrushes295
and had symbols hung around their necks.While we could hurt and threaten animals,296
and theymaywell show submissive or fearful responses, we can’t shame or humiliate297
them. We are humiliated and shamed not because we are like animals but because298
we have human needs and sensibilities of self and social contextual awareness.299
Another dimension to humiliation that is less acknowledged and requires research300
is that humiliation often crosses group boundaries. Individuals who feel humiliated301
can often feel excluded and marginalised as if they are an outgroup member. Many302
of Elison and Harter’s (2007) examples that involved murderous vengeance suggest303
experiences of being an outcast, a ridiculed out-grouper, not just subordinated. This304
may explain partly why humiliated fury can often be taken out on a number of305
individuals who represent that groups identity. Humiliated fury can create the desire306
to ‘do unto others as has been done to me’ a sort of inversion of the golden rule.307
Another aspect of humiliation is it can create destructive envy and jealousy (Gilbert,308
1992, 1998c). In a famous Beatles song Run for Your Life, (on the album Rubber309
Soul) are the words ‘I’d rather see you dead little girl than to be with another man.’310
Sometimes jilted people refer to feeling humiliated rather than shamed by a rejection311
or infidelity, again with an intense desire for vengeance. Indeed, in some cultures312
it is a basis for honour killing. John Lennon later regretted writing the song and313
it was his least favourite, but it speaks to a dark theme of sexually, competitive314
driven humiliation. So in shame the focus is on the damaged reputation to oneself315
and as agent which is commonly internalised in negative self-evaluation whereas316
in humiliation the focus is on (what is seen as) unjustifiable devaluation harm and317
ridicule that’s been done by another. In terms of competitive dynamics of humiliation,318
the experiencer seeks to dominate or injure the humiliator. These sentiments are not319
part of shame.320
These distinctions can be depicted in Figs. 27.1 and 27.2.321
Figure 27.2 depicts that in the first instance humans are born with extraordinarily322
sensitive needs to be cared for and looked after by others and be held in positive323
regard. From an early age they are constantly looking for approval of their displays324
and validation of their feelings. They are learning not only how they exist in the325
minds of others but how others are disposed towards them. They are particularly326
attentive to voice tones and facial expressions that indicate different emotions in the327
carer. Cold or rejecting facial expressions and voice tones can indicate that we are328
held negatively in the minds of others creating in the first instance an experience of329
external shame. We have a sense that we are not an attractive social agent, and this330
sensitises various threats systems, orientating attention and defensive manoeuvres331
(Gilbert, 1998b, 1998c). If on the other hand the individual perceives the environment332
is hostile, unfair and unjust then the experience is not rooted in self attribution’s but333
in external attributions and humiliation.334
Figure 27.2 also demonstrates that we can have reflected shame and a sense of335
humiliation whereby these can be brought to families or groups by its members336
or member. For example, in some cultures honour killing is for a family member,337
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Fig. 27.2 An evolutionary and biopsychosocial model for shame and humiliation Adapted from
Gilbert (2002)
usually a young woman seeking their own sexuality who is deemed to have brought338
shame or humiliation to the family and tarnished the reputation and honour of the339
family (Gilbert, Gilbert, & Sanghera, 2004). Some cultures regard this as justified340
and indeed honourable whereas others as a crime and shameful.341
Importantly, the self-conscious emotions can coexist. For example, it is very com-342
mon in forensic services to find individuals who respond very aggressively to any343
threats upon them and who speak in the language of humiliation. However, as they344
engage in therapeutic explorations it becomes clear they also carry an intense sense345
of vulnerability, feelings of unworthiness and a sense of shame. Their aggressive346
humiliation-behaviour is actually a defence against experiencing this vulnerable,347
inferior sense of self. So aggressive behaviour itself is not a clear defining distinction348
between the two self-conscious emotions.349
27.7 Guilt350
Many authors tend to lump shame, humiliation and guilt together as part of the same351
family of self-conscious emotions, but an exploration of their evolutionary roots352
show them to be very different. The word guilt derives from the German word gelt353
which meant debt in the 8th century.354
The evolutionary origins of guilt do not lie in the sexual and resource competitive355
dynamics of life but rather in caring motives and behaviour. With the evolution of356
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parental investment and caring behaviour there was a focus on providing for infants357
such that they would be defended from harms and nurtured appropriately. Crook358
(1980) pointed out that for caring to evolve there had also to be a harm avoidance359
system such that carers are attentive to and avoid causing harm to the targets of360
their care and are motivated to take remedial action as soon as possible if they do.361
Indeed, MacLean (1990) highlighted the fact that some egg laying species such some362
fish sometimes cannibalise their own young. So one of the first evolved processes for363
caring is kin recognition and ‘don’t eat the kids’! Second, harm avoidance will evolve364
with emotional consequences to having violated that general strategy and motivate365
reparations as quickly as possible. It follows therefore that the attentional focus of366
guilt will be different to that of shame and humiliation. For example, in guilt there is367
no aggressive desire for vengeance and no concern with social reputation. The focus368
is on having caused harm and desire for reparation. The emotions of guilt relate to369
sadness and remorse which partly motivate reparation and are very different to ones370
of anxiety and anger as in shame and humiliation. Guilt is linked to empathic and371
sympathy abilities (Tangney & Dearing 2002). Empathy is important for guilt but372
not necessary for shame or humiliation. Indeed, one can feel shamed and humiliated373
through projection.374
Responses to having caused harm, even inadvertently can vary from shame to375
guilt. For example, imagine driving down the road and a dog runs out and you hit it.376
Externalising anger would focus on the damage the dog has done to your car (stupid377
dog); external shamewould focus on fear ofwhat othersmight say about your driving,378
internal shame on negative self-evaluation ‘why am I not careful enough’. In such379
cases one might be tempted to drive on. Guilt focuses on sadness and sorrow and380
one is more likely to stop and help the injured animal. One’s mind is not focused on381
what others might think or even judgements of one’s driving but on the injured dog.382
Guilt is therefore a moral emotion in a way that shame often it is not (Tracy et al.383
2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Guilt supports prosocial behaviour, and builds384
interpersonal bonds (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton 1994). This suggests that385
the negative affect of guilt or the anticipation of guilt may nudge us towards care and386
compassion (Gilbert, 2009, 2017a). While shame may motivate individuals to try to387
repair the damage they caused, this is primarily to repair their own reputation and388
reduce external shame or sometimes to help themselves feel better about themselves.389
Indeed, study after study has shown that guilt is significantly linked to moral390
behaviour and cooperation whereas shame is not (DeHooge, Zeelenberg, &Breugel-391
mans, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Further guilt and it has low or no asso-392
ciation with mental health problems (Gilbert, 2000c; Tangney & Dearing, 2002;393
SzentaÂgotai-Tătar, & Miu, 2016). In contrast, shame proneness, when rooted in a394
deep sense of an unattractive and an undesired self, is often associated with hostile395
forms of self-criticism and is linked to whole range of psychopathologies (Gilbert,396
2009). Humiliation is seen as especially linked to the more aggressive, interpersonal397
difficulties. Approaches that over rely on cognitive explanations identify shame as398
linked to global self-evaluation whereas guilt is focused on behaviour. Although399
important these are not their defining features. Rather the underpinning motivational400
mechanisms that drive them are.401


















Another area where this distinction is very important is between restorative and402
retributive justice (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). In retributive justice403
the focus is on shaming and humiliating, the idea is to cause suffering in some sense404
and for perpetrators to know their (lowered) social place. The desire is to induce fear,405
with a sense of subordination and defeat in perpetrators so they will not be tempted406
to do it again. In addition, retributive justice is a public demonstration that justice407
has been done and to act as a deterrent; hence it is designed to be callous (Gilbert,408
2018). Restorative justice on the other hand, seeks to bring perpetrator and victim409
together in order to help the perpetrator empathise and understand the harm they have410
done. When this works well, rather than shaming and humiliating perpetrators, they411
are connected to a sense of guilt which allows them to begin to experience sadness412
and remorse. This internalised sense of responsibility taking, with a feeling of inner413
sadness for causing harm, is a more reliable source for subsequent prevention (Zehr,414
2015). It should be noted, however, that clinically individuals who are blocked out415
on their ability to experience sadness can struggle with this approach and therapeutic416
workmay be necessary to enable them towork on their own pain and suffering before417
they can appreciate the pain and suffering they have caused others (Gilbert, 2017b).418
27.8 Compassion Focused Therapy419
The evolution of social competition is ancient and often stressful. Indeed, there are420
many physiological markers linked to losing social status, and for humans being421
shamed, rejected or humiliated. In contrast, caring motivational systems evolved422
to ‘look after, protect encourage and sooth (Gilbert, 1989/2016).’ Caring motives423
organise our minds in very different ways and operate through different physio-424
logical processes to those of competitive motives. Caring, and its recent derivative425
compassion, are linked to hormones such as oxytocin and themyelinated vagaswhich426
is part of the parasympathetic system (Kirby et al., 2017; Thayer, Åhs, Fredrikson,427
Sollers, & Wager, 2012). Both have soothing functions. There is considerable evi-428
dence that access to caring others significantly attenuates stress. For example, if429
subordinate primates have access to support and soothing from kin they show less430
stress responses (Abbott et al., 2003). Many priming experiments show that attach-431
ment primes have a major impact on threatened stressed processing (e.g., Hornstein432
& Eisenberger, 2018)433
Evolution based, compassion focused therapy suggests that oneway to help people434
who are locked into problems of shame and humiliation is to switch them out of435
the competitive motivational systems into care and affiliative motivational systems436
(Gilbert, 2000c, 2010, 2017b). In this way the therapy seeks to change not only437
psychological processes but physiological ones too (Kirby et al., 2017). Hence there438
are a series of interventions and practices to help clients activate and stimulate caring439
motivational systems and their physiological mediators. These include:440
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• People are introduced to an evolutionary, psychoeducation formulation of how441
and why we can get caught up in different conflicting, motivational and emotion442
systems that can be unhelpful to us and others (called tricky brain). The focus is443
to help clients have an understanding that our minds are created by our genes and444
choreographed by our upbringing. It is not our fault the way we are but it is our445
responsibility to learn about our minds and utilise them cultivate mental processes446
and habits that can to maximise well-being and minimise causing harm to self;447
shifting from personalisation shame and blaming to compassionate responsibility448
taking.449
• People are offered the definition of compassion as sensitivity to suffering in self and450
others with a commitment to try to alleviate and prevent it (Gilbert, 2009, 2017b)451
and is rooted in courage and wisdom. The next step is to help people to mindfully452
be aware of what emotion and motivation system they are operating from at any453
point in time and how to switch into motivational and emotional systems mediated454
through compassion processing that are physiologically and psychologically more455
conducive to well-being.456
• People are helped to understand the link between motivation and physiological457
activation and provide people with a variety of postural and breathing practices,458
imagery and behavioral practices, that stimulate the vagus nerve and other phys-459
iological systems linked to caring motivation and affiliative emotion processing.460
In addition, clients are trained to use particular voice friendly and affiliative emo-461
tional textures to the thoughts, particularly self-referent thoughts. These build into462
a portfolio of practices to cultivate one’s compassionate mind463
• People are introduced to the nature of a compassionate self-identity that guides464
cultivating a compassionate mind and compassionate self. They are supported in465
exploring the benefits of practising, harnessing and living one’s life from that466
orientation. This is accompanied by a range of guided meditation practices, ways467
of thinking and ways of engaging in compassionate behaviour.468
By way of short case example consider Sally (not her real name and the details469
are changed here). Sally had experienced intense bullying as a young child about470
the weight. She came into therapy with low self-esteem, was highly self-critical,471
socially anxious and depressed. She also had a sense of shame not only around her472
appearance but also because she felt she hadn’t really achieved verymuch in life even473
though she was intelligent. Her cognitive and motivational processes were highly474
linked to competitive motivational processing that included the typical competition475
motivational themes. These included: unfavourable social comparison, tendencies476
towards submissive behaviour, believing that other people sawher as inferior,wanting477
improve her standing/status in the eyes of others, to compete and achieve in the478
world, self-monitoring and self-critical thoughts that were internally self-downing479
and shaming with a hostile contemptuous tone to them.480
The compassion focused therapist first provides a secure base and validating481
empathic connection to facilitate the client feeling validated and accepted. Talking482
about shame is itself painful and can be expressed as shameful in itself. Sally’s483
transference was competitive in the sense that she believed that therapist would484


















also judge negatively, compare her unfavourably with other clients, see her as less485
motivated or competent, and would expect her to achieve and do more. In CFT one486
would be very cautious about being pulled into that motivational system by focusing487
on doing and achieving. Instead CFT helped Sally to understand how our brains488
have evolved in such a way that we can become very focused on competitive social489
comparison, fears of what others think and feel about, us particularly if we’ve been490
bullied, and it’s very easy to get caught in these loops.491
We then explored ‘what is the part of ourselves, may be linked to our inner492
strengths, that would really help us to face and work with the things that frighten and493
upset us.’ The therapist then guides Sally to the core qualities of the compassionate494
mind, rooted as they are in courage and wisdom able to address pain and suffering.495
To help us with problems of shamewe need a part of ourselves that can be supportive,496
validating and healing which we call the compassionate self. CFT spends time on497
discovering, recruiting and cultivating this aspect of self, including its physiological498
parameters.499
Core to Sally’s therapy was helping her to recognise the hostility and undermining500
nature of her and self-criticism. This is done in a series of steps using functional anal-501
ysis and chair work. Sally was able to learn how to generate compassionate self-talk502
with friendly affiliative inner ‘tones and textures’ to her thoughts. As the internal503
compassionate competencies of Sally developed it became possible to help her use504
this aspect of her mind to address some of her shame and also engage compassion-505
ately in rescripting bullying trauma memories. So in brief Sally learnt to become506
more mindful and mind aware, recognise the value of refocusing on compassion507
motivation, activating the system and practising. Then, with the compassion focus,508
being able to move into and work with distressing areas.509
CFT was specifically developed for people with high levels of shame and self-510
criticism often linked to complex or traumatic pasts. CFT suggest that if individuals511
do not have the inner physiological infrastructures (a form of inner secure base and512
safe haven to use attachment terms rooted in systems such as the vagus nerve) and513
psychological competencies for compassion and regulating threat processing, then514
working with shame and trauma can be very difficult for them.515
27.9 Conclusion516
This chapter explored some of the evolved differences between self-conscious emo-517
tions rooted in motivational systems and competencies for defence. Shame is linked518
to competitive dynamicswhich has an inhibitory function since it is linked to subordi-519
nate defensive strategies of inhibition. Humiliation is linked to competitive dynamics520
but is the opposite and generates aggression and desires for vengeance and retaliation.521
(Out)Group identification is more common in humiliation. Guilt has a completely522
different evolutionary origin, rooted in caring behaviour with all of the competencies523
that go with it. In many studies, that other chapters to this volume explore, shame524
is associated with vulnerabilities to a range internalising type psychopathologies,525
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Table 27.1 Comparisons of external and internal shame humiliation guilt
External shame Internal shame Humiliation Guilt
Motivation competitive rank competitive rank Competitive rank Caring
Attention Mind of the other Own mind/self Mind of the other Mind of the other
Cognitive They think badly
of me
I think badly of
me
How dare they
think badly of me
I have hurt
someone













such as depression and social anxiety while humiliation is associated more with526
vengeance and aggressive acting out. Shame is particularly toxic when it is rooted in527
a sense of self as bad, unworthy or even disgusting and where there is a high degrees528
of self-criticism through to self-hatred. In contrast guilt is associated with prosocial529
behaviour and is not linked to psychopathology or vengeance. This is partly because530
it’s rooted in a completely different motivational system that its patterns, emotional531
dispositions and sense of self are quite differently to shame and humiliation (Giner-532
Sorolla 2015).533
As a summary Table 27.1 gives a simplified overview of some of the differences534
between internal and external shame, humiliation and guilt.535
These distinctions are important particularly in psychotherapy. For example, com-536
passion focused therapy (Gilbert, 2010) helps individuals identify forms of shame-537
based self-criticism and how to switch into self-compassion. For humiliation it helps538
individuals work with their sense of anger, address potential underlying unprocessed539
emotions associated with humiliation and where appropriate develop forgiveness.540
If harm has been done then enabling people to process guilt is essential. For some541
individuals processing these emotions is very difficult because it takes them into542
their own emotional pain. Group relationships and cultural dynamics of what is and543
what is not shaming add new dimensions of experience that are lacquered into the544
sense of oneself as ‘a confident desirable attractive person’ or one ‘vulnerable to crit-545
icism rejection and exclusion.’ Seeing these experiences through the lens of evolved546
motivation systems offer new avenues for research and therapy.547
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